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Excessive or Warranted? The Unshackling of 
Discovery Sanctions in Lee v. Max International, LLC 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A core principle of the American legal philosophy is that disputes 
should be decided on their merits. However, attorneys often wrangle 
over legal procedure and deprive meritorious disputes of their day in 
court. At times, the discovery process reflects a battleground with 
little indicia of ethical advocacy.1 In Lee v. Max International, LLC,2 
the Tenth Circuit correctly reproved an abusive litigant who was 
granted substantial leniency during the discovery process. The court 
sustained the most severe of sanctions—dismissal with prejudice. 
This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit correctly affirmed the 
dismissal sanction provided under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) and appropriately followed Supreme Court 
precedent. Those circuits that have not yet adopted the Supreme 
Court’s framework should eliminate the inflexible tests they require 
of their district court judges in deciding dismissal sanction cases. The 
increased complexity and expense of discovery provides shameless 
attorneys with a system in which they often can test the resolve of 
the district courts and disregard their discovery obligations. The 
Tenth Circuit’s opinion rightfully concluded that a district court 
should not be required to discuss a detailed set of factors while 
analyzing the appropriateness of a dismissal sanction. Any additional 
test would be superfluous within the current dismissal framework 
outlined by the Supreme Court.  
 
 1. For an example of aggressive advocacy gone awry, see Professor Charles Yablon’s 
description of a libel suit brought by Phillip Morris Company against the American 
Broadcasting Company. Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1618 (1996). The attorneys for Philip Morris responded to the 
discovery requests of ABC with documents later referred to as “critically sensitive flavoring 
documents.” Id. All of the estimated one million documents were printed on “red paper with 
squiggly lines,” making them difficult to photocopy or read. Id. In addition, attorneys for ABC 
claimed that the documents “gave off noxious fumes that made it difficult to work with the 
altered copies for any extended periods of time.” Id. 
 2. 638 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The case began as many do. Markyl Lee filed a complaint 
alleging that Max International breached a distributorship agreement 
between the two parties.3 During the discovery process, Max made 
standard discovery requests with which Lee did not comply, and Max 
filed a motion to compel.4 The magistrate judge granted Max’s 
motion and ordered that Lee produce “a variety of documents,” but 
to no avail.5 In light of Lee’s disregard of the court order, Max filed 
a request to dismiss the case. Fortunately for the plaintiff, the court 
granted Lee one additional opportunity to satisfy the court order by 
producing the requested documentation.6 The judge was clearly 
frustrated with Lee’s disobedience and issued a warning that 
“‘continued non-compliance [would] result in the harshest of 
sanctions.’”7 
After the court’s warning, Lee declared to the court that he had 
complied with the court order, even though he had only provided a 
few of the requested documents.8 Max was not satisfied with Lee’s 
efforts as evidenced by a letter he sent to Lee “claiming that various 
materials still remained missing.”9 Lee did not respond to the letter 
and Max renewed his motion to dismiss, which apparently motivated 
Lee to provide more of the requested documents. In the intervening 
weeks prior to the judge’s decision on the motion to dismiss, Max 
received more of the remaining documents.10 
As the documents trickled in, the magistrate judge reviewed the 
motion to dismiss.11 It was obvious to the court that Lee had not 
complied with the court order at the time of his sworn declaration. 
Apparently, what motivated Lee was not necessarily the court order, 
but the fear of possible sanctions. The magistrate judge was not 
pleased with Lee and recommended to the district court that it grant 
Max’s request for dismissal, which it did, dismissing the case with 
 
 3. Id. at 1319. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1320. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
MEHR.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  11:50 AM 
607 Excessive or Warranted? 
 609 
prejudice.12 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit sided with the district 
court and affirmed the dismissal.13 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Evolution of Rule 37 Sanctions 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may 
seek a motion to dismiss in the event that an opposing party violates 
a court order compelling discovery.14 Rule 37 states: “If a party or a 
party’s officer, director, or managing agent . . . fails to obey an order 
to provide or permit discovery . . . the court where the action is 
pending may issue further just orders,” which may include 
“dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.”15 The 
word “failure” and its derivatives were part of the earliest edition of 
the rules.16 However, the text of the various subsections of the first 
edition continually switched back and forth between the usage of 
“failure” and “refusal.”17 This “aimless shuttling between ‘refusal’ 
and ‘failure’” caused difficulty in the “administration [of the rules] 
outside the courts [and] flexible use in them.”18  
Arguably, the subtle, yet meaningful, difference between 
“failure” and “refusal” caused a misapplication of the rules. For Rule 
37 sanctions, the distinction was critical because, at that time, the 
rule provided sanctions for a party that refused to obey a court 
order.19 On occasion, this phrase caused courts to interpret the rule 
only to allow sanctions when a party had refused, and not simply 
failed, to obey the order.20 The persistence of this distinction was  
 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v); see also 8B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2281 (3d ed. 2011) (“[A]ny party or person who seeks to 
evade or thwart full and candid discovery incurs the risk of serious consequences.”). 
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v) (emphasis added). 
 16. WRIGHT, supra note 14. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 
480, 489 (1958). 
 19. Id. at 489 (emphasis added). 
 20. Jodi Golinsky, Discovery Abuse: The Second Circuit’s Imposition of Litigation-Ending 
Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Discovery Orders: Should Rule 37(b)(2) and Dismissals be 
Determined by a Roll of the Dice?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 585, 592 (1996). 
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one of the reasons that later motivated a change in the rules: 
removing “refusal” from the rules altogether.21 
 The Supreme Court sought to limit the minor distinction that 
had played out in the lower courts.22 In Societe Internationale v. 
Rogers,23 the Court made it clear that this “too fine a literalism” 
between “failure” and “refusal” created an inappropriate distinction 
between the subsections of the rules.24 According to the Court, this 
was an unintended distinction upon which lower courts should not 
rely.25  
In 1970, the Advisory Committee replaced “refusal” with 
“failure” to align the rules with the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
in Societe Internationale.26 This clear interpretation and subsequent 
modification of the rules reflected the Court’s and the Committee’s 
intention to close a potential loophole for unyielding attorneys. Both 
institutions made it clear that a litigant that simply failed to obey a 
discovery order, as opposed to refusing to obey, could potentially 
face dismissal of his case. The new direction represented an 
expansion of potential dismissal actions.  
Because dismissal is the most severe of sanctions, the Court 
recognized that there may be instances where dismissal would not be 
appropriate.27 The Court in Societe Internationale outlined a 
difference between which litigant actions warranted dismissal and 
which actions required a lesser sanction. The Court said that Rule 37 
“should not be construed to authorize dismissal of [a] complaint 
because of petitioner’s noncompliance with a pretrial production 
order when it has been established that failure to comply has been due 
to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of 
petitioner.”28 Therefore, a failure to comply with a court order 
because a litigant lacks the ability to comply with the order does not 
warrant dismissal.29 The potential for dismissal comes when a failure 
 
 21. Id. at 592–93. 
 22. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S. A. v. 
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1958). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 207. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 212. 
 28. Id. (emphasis added). 
 29. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 2283 (The two principle facets of the constitutional 
limits stemming from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are: “First, the court must ask 
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to comply falls within the “willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of 
petitioner” analysis.30 
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Commitment to Enforce Dismissal 
Sanctions 
In National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed its intention to enforce sanctions when a 
litigant fails to comply with a discovery order.31 Previously, the 
Supreme Court was mostly concerned with the sanctions affecting 
the litigants appearing in the current case. However, National 
Hockey represented an effort by the Court to provide a general 
deterrent to all litigants contemplating disobedience of discovery 
orders.32 
Over a seventeen month period, the plaintiffs in National Hockey 
failed to answer various interrogatories submitted by the defendants 
during discovery, continually “flouting” the court’s discovery orders 
and timelines.33 In dismissing the case, the district court stated that 
the plaintiff’s actions represented a “callous disregard of 
responsibilities counsel owe to the Court and to their opponents.”34 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, however, overturned the district 
court’s decision.35 Utilizing the language of Societe Internationale, 
the court found that there was insufficient evidence that the failure 
to act “was in flagrant bad faith, willful or intentional.”36 The court 
reasoned that new counsel was representing the litigant, that counsel 
had a difficult time “obtaining some of the requested information,” 
and that “none of the parties had really pressed [the] discovery” 
 
whether there is a sufficient relationship between the discovery and the merits sought to be 
foreclosed by the sanction to legitimate depriving a party of the opportunity to litigate the 
merits. Second, before imposing a serious merits sanction the court should determine whether 
the party guilty of a failure to provide discovery was unable to comply with the discovery.”). 
 30. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 212. See also Archibeque v. Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 70 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 31. 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). 
 32. Id. at 643 (Allowing a district court to dismiss is not only “to penalize those whose 
conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted 
to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.”). 
 33. Id. at 640, 643. 
 34. Id. at 640. 
 35. In re Prof’l Hockey Antitrust Litig., 531 F.2d 1188, 1195 (1976), rev’d sub nom. 
Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976). 
 36. Id. 
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obligations.37 According to the Third Circuit, the litigants’ 
extenuating circumstances warranted leniency.38 
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit explaining that 
lenity is certainly a factor to consider when imposing sanctions under 
Rule 37, but it is not the only factor.39 The appellate court 
undoubtedly felt the significant weight that a dismissal with 
prejudice imposes. However, the Supreme Court explained that 
lenity “cannot be allowed to wholly supplant other and equally 
necessary considerations embodied in [the] Rule.”40 The Court 
further explained that hindsight creates a natural tendency to 
minimize the severity of sanctions, which can result in a court 
incorrectly reversing an earlier dismissal.41 Because of this tendency, 
the Court held that it was necessary to balance the role of lenity with 
that of enforcement, because it is equally as important not to allow 
litigants to “flout . . . discovery orders.”42 
By overturning the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court minimized 
the “willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner” language of 
Societe Internationale.43 After National Hockey, questions still remain 
as to whether any showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault is still 




 37. National Hockey, 427 U.S. at 640 (1976). (The Supreme Court  listed a summary 
of factors considered by the Third Circuit: “[N]one of the parties had really pressed discovery 
until after a consent decree was entered between petitioners and all of the other original 
plaintiffs . . . . [R]espondents’ counsel took over the litigation, which previously had been 
managed by another attorney . . . . [R]espondents’ counsel encountered difficulties in 
obtaining some of the requested information . . . . [And] respondents’ lead counsel assured the 
District Court that he would not knowingly and willfully disregard the final deadline.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 642. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 643. 
 43. See Eric. C. Surette, Annotation, Sanctions Available Under Rule 37, Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Other Than Exclusion of Expert Testimony, for Failure to Obey Discovery 
Order Not Related to Expert Witness, 156 A.L.R. Fed. 601, *3a (2011) (“While the Supreme 
Court in Societe Internationale Pour Particpations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. 
Rogers . . . held that before a complaint can be dismissed the district court must make a finding 
that the offending party’s failure to comply with a discovery order was the result of willfulness, 
bad faith, or fault, the continued viability of this holding is in doubt in light of National 
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.”). 
 44. Id. 
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Supreme Court not only endorsed “utiliz[ing] the extreme sanction 
of dismissal,” it encouraged it.45 
The Supreme Court has consistently reformed the rules in favor 
of enforcing dismissal sanctions. From the earliest amendments of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the Court’s opinion in 
National Hockey, the Court has attempted to provide a procedural 
deterrent to unrestrained attorneys. The Societe Internationale 
language, “willfulness bad faith, or any fault of petitioner,” is helpful 
in analyzing the difference between a litigant’s failure to comply and 
an inability to comply. However, this language was later minimized 
in favor of a harsher standard in National Hockey. Arguably, the 
Court’s trend reflects a desire to remove hurdles that prevent district 
courts from enforcing discovery sanctions. 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
In Lee v. Max International, LLC, the Tenth Circuit determined 
that Lee’s failure to comply with the magistrate judge’s discovery 
orders represented “strong evidence of willfulness and bad faith,” 
and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal with 
prejudice.46 
The plaintiffs argued that the district court had not discussed 
what is colloquially referred to in the circuit as the Ehrenhaus test 
when it dismissed the case with prejudice. The Ehrenhaus test 
emphasizes five factors for the district court to consider: 
[A] court may wish to consider when deciding whether to exercise 
its discretion to issue a dismissal sanction: (1) the degree of actual 
prejudice to the defendant; (2) the amount of interference with the 
judicial process; (3) the culpability of the litigant; (4) whether the 
court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action 
would be a likely sanction for non-compliance; and (5) the efficacy 
of lesser sanctions.47 
However, the circuit court concluded that these factors “do not 
represent a rigid test that a district court must always apply.”48 The 
court said that the facts may be helpful in determining when 
 
 45. Golinsky, supra note 20, at 593. 
 46. Lee v. Max Int’l LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1321 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 47. Id. at 1323 (citing Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921(10th Cir. 1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 48. Id. 
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dismissal is warranted, but a “district court’s failure to mention or 
afford them extended discussion does not guarantee an automatic 
reversal.”49 
 Additionally, the court adopted a general deterrence policy.50 
The court accepted the principle that “district courts must have 
latitude to use severe sanctions for purposes of general deterrence.”51 
V. ANALYSIS 
The decision in Lee v. Max International, LLC, correctly 
sustained the Rule 37 dismissal sanction. By pronouncing a general 
deterrent, the Tenth Circuit rightfully sought to motivate litigants to 
comply with discovery orders or face unforgiving sanctions. The 
Tenth Circuit’s opinion concluded that a district court is not 
required to discuss a detailed set of factors while analyzing the 
dismissal sanction. Arguably, a specific test or detailed set of factors 
would be superfluous to the current framework provided by the 
Supreme Court. Those circuits that have not yet adopted the 
position of the Supreme Court in National Hockey should eliminate 
the stringent tests necessary for review of dismissal sanction cases. 
Courts should instead encourage early judicial intervention in the 
discovery process. Encouraging courts to enforce discovery 
obligations earlier in the case through court orders will not only 
preempt discovery abuse but it will also provide a stronger warning 
to litigants. This early intervention must be sustained through the 
courts’ continued support of a general deterrence policy. A general 
deterrence policy will further support the early judicial intervention 
principles—preempting abuse and providing a warning. 
A. The Circuit Courts Should Eliminate the Superfluous Tests and 
Afford Discretion to the District Courts 
Among the various circuit courts, no single test or approach has 
been adopted in more than one circuit.52 The circuits’ varying 
approaches are representative of the uncertainty that pervades the 
dismissal doctrine. Arguably, the Supreme Court has attempted to 
 
 49. Id. at 1324. 
 50. Id. at 1320. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Golinsky, supra note 20, at 596. 
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encourage the lower courts to enforce the sanction without a need 
for a detailed list of factors that a district court must consider. 
However, these tests or lists remain.  
The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have each 
outlined some form of a test.53 For example, in the Ninth Circuit, 
the district court is required to consider “(1) the public’s interest in 
expeditious resolution of litigation, (2) the court’s need to manage 
its dockets, (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions, 
(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, 
and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.”54 In the circuits 
requiring specific factors, each court’s test differs from the other 
circuits in the quantity of factors and substance of their tests.55 
The remaining circuits, the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh, consider general guidelines that do not 
subscribe to any specific factors.56 For example, the Seventh Circuit 
stated that “[t]he cases in this circuit . . . do not set up a row of 
artificial hoops labeled ‘bad faith’ and ‘egregious conduct’ and ‘no 
less severe alternative’ through which a judge must jump in order to 
be permitted by us appellate judges to dismiss a suit.”57 It is enough 
to warrant dismissal in the Seventh Circuit when “a pattern of 
noncompliance with a court’s discovery orders emerge[s].”58 As the 
Seventh Circuit suggests, a pattern of noncompliance should be 
 
 53. See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1330 n.18 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(discussing the Third Circuit’s six factor test); Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Richards & 
Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s four factor 
test); FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380–81 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s 
several factor test); Beil v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(discussing the Sixth Circuit’s several factor test); Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1166 
(9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s five factor test). 
 54. Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 55. Supra note 53. See also Golinsky, supra note 20, at 603–04. 
 56. See Damiani v. Rhode Island Hosp., 704 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1983). (discussing 
the First Circuit’s adherence to National Hockey’s general deterrence doctrine); Oliveri v. 
Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing the Second Circuit’s lack of “an 
integrated code of sanctions”); Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(discussing the Eighth Circuit’s strong policy of deciding a case on its merits); see also 
Golinsky, supra note 20, at 588, 596. 
 57. Newman v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 962 F.2d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(citing Patterson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 852 F.2d 280, 284–85 (7th Cir.1988) (per 
curiam); see also Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 1997) (Sufficient 
egregious conduct warranted dismissal. In this case the record provided sufficient evidence of 
egregious conduct.). 
 58. Newman, 962 F.2d at 591. 
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sufficient to justify dismissal. Arguably, this approach more closely 
aligns with the intention of the Supreme Court in National Hockey. 
The Tenth Circuit has followed this line of reasoning by adopting 
this principle in Lee. 59 In the Tenth Circuit, such a pattern of 
noncompliance is prima facie evidence of willfulness and bad faith.60 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision not to a adopt a specific test was 
clearly explained in Lee.61 The court refused to require the district 
court to review the list of factors included in the Ehrenhaus test.62 
Many of the factors adopted by the circuits requiring tests are similar 
to the Ehrenhaus test.63 In the Tenth Circuit, however, the test is not 
really a test at all. Rather, it is a set of factors that could be 
considered by a lower court before it imposes a dismissal sanction.64 
The factors are more appropriately referred to as “guide posts [a] 
district court may wish to ‘consider’ in the exercise of what must 
always remain a discretionary function.”65 These “guide posts” are 
not part of an exhaustive list of considerations,66 but merely an aid 
for the district court to consider in exercising its discretion. 
A district court is rightly afforded discretion when it comes to 
matters of discovery because a district court judge deals with 
discovery more often than an appellate court. As the Lee court 
suggested, “discovery disputes are analogous” to the criminal 
sentencing context in that the trial judge is in the best position to 
rule on the issue and should have discretion.67 Similar to the criminal 
context, the district court judges experience the attorneys’ 
maneuvering and schemes first hand. Arguably, requiring a district 
court to consider a list of factors that are not inherently exhaustive 
removes discretion and places unnecessary hurdles in the system. 
 
 
 59. Lee v. Max Int’l, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1321 (2011) (“[A] party’s thrice repeated 
failure to produce materials that have always been and remain within its control is strong 
evidence of willfulness and bad faith, and in any event is easily fault enough, we hold, to 
warrant dismissal or default judgment.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1323. 
 62. Id. at 1324. 
 63. Supra note 53. 
 64. Lee, 638 F.3d at 1323; see also Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 
1465 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). 
 65. Lee, 638 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1320. 
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On the most basic level, the Tenth Circuit has followed the 
Supreme Court precedent. As emphasized in National Hockey, a 
district court that has considered the entire record and made a 
decision dismissing a case with prejudice has not necessarily abused 
its discretion.68 The Tenth Circuit’s focus was on the review of the 
entire record, not on a five factor test. The court sufficiently outlined 
in Lee that the Ehrenhaus test is not determinative in dismissing a 
case in the Tenth Circuit.69 The factors are general guidelines to the 
district court as it performs its discretionary function in reviewing the 
record. Those circuits requiring tests should follow the Tenth 
Circuit’s approach because their rigid tests fail to afford the 
appropriate level of discretion to the district courts and place 
unnecessary hurdles in the way of appropriate sanctions. 
B. Early Judicial Intervention and General Deterrence Are Key 
1. Judicial intervention limits discovery time and expense 
Discovery abuse thwarts the main goal of the FRCP “to secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”70 Courts, practitioners, and clients all acknowledge that 
the discovery process can unnecessarily increase both the time and 
expense of litigation.71 Our system cannot simply remove discovery 
from the process, so it must be modified. One significant way to 
decrease discovery time and expense is for attorneys to honor 
discovery requests and court orders. For obvious reasons, appealing 
to an attorney’s altruistic desire to honor discovery requests and 
comply with court orders will not prove effective. Instead, a 
definitive approach to encourage compliance would be for courts to 
engage with discovery early in litigation by issuing court orders 
earlier in the process and to continue to deter other litigants from 
noncompliance by utilizing the harsher dismissal sanction. 
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) and other legal institutions 
recognize the problems imposed by the delays and cost of 
discovery.72 In an effort to determine ways in which the system could 
 
 68. Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 641–42 (1976). 
 69. Lee, 638 F.3d at 1323. 
 70. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 71. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY 
SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (2010). 
 72. Id. at 1–2. 
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be improved, the FJC conducted surveys of various legal 
practitioners.73 The surveys were a useful tool that resulted in 
increased discussion of possible improvements to the FRCP.74 One 
of the results of the surveys was a series of “Pilot Project Rules” that 
were promulgated by the Institute for the Advancement of the 
American Legal System.75 Rule Twelve of the pilot rules addresses 
sanctions.76 It states that sanctions are “appropriate for any failure to 
provide or for unnecessary delay in providing required disclosures or 
discovery.”77 The rule is not dissimilar from Rule 37 of the FRCP. 
Apparently, the newly drafted Pilot Project Rules seem to be based 
on the idea that enforcement of sanctions should be based on a 
failure to provide, or in other words, a noncompliance type 
standard. This is in line with the Tenth Circuit’s approach and with 
what the Supreme Court promulgated in National Hockey. 
The FJC’s survey results also demonstrate that practicing 
attorneys identify discovery as the primary cause of litigation delay; 
one of the most common practitioner responses to the question 
“about ‘the primary cause of delay in the litigation process’ was ‘time 
to complete discovery.’”78 In addition, the survey suggests that 
attorneys are disaffected with the finagling that goes on during the 
discovery process. One attorney stated that “[d]iscovery abuse is 
rampant—parties . . . stonewall routinely and then negotiate over 
how many of their legal obligations they can avoid.”79 Regardless of 
the inherently time-consuming nature of discovery, if the judiciary 
were to engage in the discovery process earlier, discovery abuse could 
be limited. Once a discovery plan is in place, the court should 
enforce the timelines and reasonable demands of counsel seeking 
compliance with the discovery order. Providing early warnings and, if 
necessary, court orders will increase the integrity of the FRCP. The 
judiciary can set the tone of the discovery stage early in the litigation 
process and insist on compliance. 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. PAUL C. SAUNDERS & REBECCA L. KOURLIS, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS, REPORT FROM THE TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND CIVIL JUSTICE 1–4 (2010). 
 75. 21ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR REFORM PILOT PROJECT 
RULES, INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2009). 
 76. Id. at 7. 
 77. Id. 
 78. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 71, at 2. 
 79. Id. at 8 n.13. 
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Apart from the extended length of time, there are two additional 
reasons why discovery is expensive. First, the lack of judicial 
enforcement of discovery obligations not only increases the time it 
takes to complete discovery, but it also increases the cost.80 Second, 
the generally accepted law firm economic model provides an 
incentive to increase the costs of discovery81 because lawyers may use 
it as a way to increase the number of hours they bill to clients.82 
While changing this economic model could be considered a desirable 
outcome, encouraging such a change is probably not the most 
effective solution. Rather, dealing with the first suggested obstacle 
will necessarily impact the second. Arguably, encouraging the 
judiciary to enforce sanctions will invariably affect the agency 
problem inherent in the law firm economic model. 
Early judicial intervention in discovery issues will decrease both 
time and costs. Many practitioners agree that “[i]ntervention by 
judges or magistrate judges early in the case helps to limit 
discovery.”83 If discovery can be limited, it will more closely align 
with the stated goals of the FRCP. By aligning discovery with the 
stated goals, time and capital necessary to complete discovery should 
decrease. 
2. A general deterrence policy sustains the Rule 37 sanctions 
In addition to early intervention, the judiciary should continue 
to support a general deterrence policy. Such a policy was adopted by 
the Supreme Court in National Hockey.84 Some have suggested that 
this policy was one the Federal Rules did not intend.85 However, in 
light of current practitioner opinion regarding the lack of respect and 
 
 80. Id. (Another attorney suggested that costs would decrease “if judges would 
‘[e]nforce sanctions for discovery abuses. Much of the costs we deal with relate to trying to get 
sufficient discovery—the delay and the costs of filing motions to compel, etc., increase costs 
significantly.’”). 
 81. Id. at 1 (“The statement, ‘Economic models in many law firms result in more 
discovery and thus more expense than is necessary,’ elicited more agreement than disagreement 
in each of the surveys and among all groups.”). 
 82. Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear’s The Barrister 
and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 649, 654 (1989). 
 83. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 71, at 2. 
 84. Golinsky, supra note 20, at 594. 
 85. Id. (“Prior to National Hockey general deterrence was not an established or even 
articulated goal of sanctions, particularly the imposition of harsh sanctions.”). 
MEHR.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  11:50 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
620 
enforcement of the Rules of Civil Procedure,86 such a negative view 
of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on dismissal is unwarranted. The 
possibility that future parties could disregard their discovery 
obligations suggests that providing notice of the potential for harsh 
sanctions could deter them from such a decision. As the Second 
Circuit concluded: 
Negligent, no less than intentional, wrongs are fit subjects for 
general deterrence. And gross professional incompetence no less 
than deliberate tactical intransigence may be responsible for the 
interminable delays and costs that plague modern complex 
lawsuits. . . . [W]here gross professional negligence has been 
found—that is, where counsel clearly should have understood his 
duty to the court—the full range of sanctions may be marshalled.87 
The Tenth Circuit has likewise employed a general deterrence 
policy.88 The Lee court stated that “no one . . . should count on 
more than three chances to make good a discovery obligation.”89 
Apart from deterring future litigants, the policy will protect the 
efficiency of the judicial system, help control court dockets, and 
lessen the unfair prejudice imposed on unsuspecting litigants. Courts 
will do well to continue to emphasize general enforcement of the 
rules and protect future litigants and courts. A combined effort of 
early intervention and general deterrence will increase the integrity of 
the rules. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the egregious conduct of Lee in this case, the Tenth 
Circuit correctly concluded that Lee’s disregard of discovery 
obligations was strong evidence of willfulness and bad faith 
warranting dismissal with prejudice. The court correctly came to this 
conclusion by relying on the Supreme Court precedent in National 
Hockey, an opinion that minimizes the need to follow a specific test 
in order to determine willfulness or bad faith. The Tenth Circuit 
recognized that a test or list of factors is not exhaustive and should 
therefore only be used as potential considerations/guidelines for a 
 
 86. See supra Part V.B.1. 
 87. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 
1062, 1067–68 (2d. Cir 1979) (citations omitted). 
 88. Lee v. Max Int’l LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 89. Id. at 1319. 
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district court considering the dismissal sanction. Those circuit courts 
still enforcing a required list of factors should adopt the principles 
espoused by the Tenth Circuit and supported by the Supreme Court. 
In this way, district courts will be afforded broad discretion in 
making a determination regarding dismissal. Such determinations 
will be less frequent and less damaging with early judicial 
intervention in the discovery process. Furthermore, a general 
deterrence policy, as outlined by the Tenth Circuit, will guide future 
litigants and help ensure that they will comply with their discovery 
obligations. 
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